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The General Mining Law and the Doctrine
of Pedis Possessio: The Case for
Congressional Action
The General Mining Law of 1872,1 enacted with the dual pur-
pose of encouraging mineral development 2 and promoting settle-
ment of the West,3 allows prospecting on unappropriated public
lands.4 Under the statute, a prospector who discovers a valuable
1 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1976). The statute opens "all valuable mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the United States . . . to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase." Id. § 22. Subsequent statutes have excluded
some important minerals from the General Mining Law's coverage. The Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920, id. §§ 181-287, created a different statutory scheme for coal, gas, oil
shale, phosphate, sulphur (in Louisiana and New Mexico), potassium, sodium, native
asphalt, solid and semisolid bitumen, and bituminous rock (such as tar sands). Id. § 181.
The Common Varieties Act of 1955, id. §§ 601-615, excluded common varieties of sand,
stone, gravel, and some other construction materials from General Mining Law coverage. Id.
§ 611. The General Mining Law still governs prospecting for gold, silver, lead, tin, copper,
nickel, molybdenum, uranium, and other hard rock minerals. Id. §§ 23, 35.
2 The title of the General Mining Law of 1872 was "An act to promote the Develop-
ment of the Mining Resources of the United States." Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat.
91, 91.
3 McBroom, Mineral Exploration and Recreation Development on National Resource
Lands-Compatible or Incompatible?, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1972).
4 Unappropriated public lands are federal lands that have not been withdrawn from
mineral exploration. In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission estimated total fed-
eral land holdings to be 755.4 million acres, or approximately one-third of the nation's
lands. Of that, approximately 87%, or 657.3 million acres, was accessible to miners. PUBLIC
LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 20-22 (1970). Mining laws
do not apply to lands used by the Department of Defense, id. at 20, or in national parks or
monuments, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Mining is permitted in na-
tional forests, see Friends of the Earth v. Butz, 406 F. Supp 742 (D. Mont. 1975), and on
lands controlled by the Bureau of Land Management, PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMIS-
SION, supra, at 20-21.
Withdrawal of public lands from mining may be accomplished in any of three ways: by
an act of Congress, by an executive officer pursuant to specific congressional delegations, or
by an executive officer based on an asserted inherent power. Bennethum & Lee, Is Our
Account Overdrawn?, 61 MINING CONG. J. 33, 33 (1975). See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1976) (authorizing the Secretary of Inte-
rior to withdraw certain federal land from settlement, location, or entry).
How much public land has been closed to mining activity is a matter of dispute: repre-
sentatives of the mining industry estimate about 65% of federal land has been withdrawn
from mining; environmentalists estimate only 10-15% has been withdrawn. Lee & Benne-
thum, Is Our Account Overdrawn? A Reassessment, 6 MATERIALS & Soc'Y 15, 17 (1982). In
recent years, representatives of the mining industry have argued that too high a percentage
of the nation's land is now closed to mining. Marsh & Sherwood, Metamorphosis in Mining
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mineral 5 may acquire fee simple title to the land within his claim.'
The statute, however, does not define a prospector's rights during
the exploration period before he actually discovers minerals; pre-
discovery rights are governed by the state common law doctrine of
pedis possessio.7
Pedis possessio protects a prospector who is diligently search-
ing for minerals on public land against forcible, fraudulent, surrep-
titious, or clandestine entries by rival prospectors onto land which
Law: Federal Legislative and Regulatory Amendment and Supplementation of the General
Mining Law Since 1955, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 209, 306-12 (1980). In response, Pres-
ident Reagan has announced a "new 'national materials and minerals program'" that will
"make it easier to withdraw lands from Federal Government protection, making them avail-
able for exploration and the mining of minerals." N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1982, at Al, col. 1
(quoting Reagan speech of April 5, 1982).
5 The General Mining Law provides "no location of a mining-claim shall be made until
the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." 30 U.S.C. § 23
(1976). To satisfy § 23's discovery requirement, there must be discovery of a mineral in
place. Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 456-57, 267 P. 184, 185 (1928). Discovery requires that
the mineral be physically exposed. Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D. Ariz.
1976), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thomas v. Andrus, 552 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977).
What constitutes discovery of a valuable mineral varies with the nature of the dispute
and the parties involved. Knutson & Morris, Locating, Maintaining, and Patenting Groups
or Large Blocks of Mining Claims, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 517, 549-50 (1980). In a
controversy between rival claimants, a prospector need satisfy only the "liberal" or "prudent
man rule" of Walter Castle, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455, 457 (1894) (holding there is discovery
of valuable mineral if "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further ex-
penditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a
mine"). Knutson & Morris, supra, at 549-50. In a case against the government, a prospector
must demonstrate present ability to market at a profit. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S.
599, 600, 602 (1968). See generally Reeves, The Law of Discovery Since Coleman, 21 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 415 (1975).
Although 30 U.S.C. § 23 requires discovery before a claim is marked off, or located, and
although most states require discovery before recordation, see, e.g., Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-
101 (1977 & Supp. 1982), courts have allowed miners to locate and record claims prior to
discovery, see, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1919); Ranchers Explora-
tion & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D. Utah 1965); Weed v. Snook, 144
Cal. 439, 444-45, 77 P. 1023, 1026 (1904); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 243-45, 327 P.2d
308, 314-15 (1958); Sparks v. Mount, 29 Wyo. 1, 6, 207 P. 1099, 1100 (1922). A "location
must be distinctly marked on the ground so that its boundaries can be readily traced." 30
U.S.C § 28 (1976).
6 The General Mining Law provides for two types of claims. Lode claims are made of
rocks occurring in veins and are accompanied by the right to follow the vein laterally, 30
U.S.C. §§ 23, 27 (1976); placer claims include claims on "all forms of deposit, excepting
veins of quartz, or other rock in place," id. § 35. A single lode claim may equal, but not
exceed, 1500 feet in length and 600 feet in width, or approximately 20 acres. Id. § 23. A
single placer claim may not exceed twenty acres. Id. § 35. The Mining Law does not, how-
ever, limit the number of separate claims one person may locate. See id. §§ 23, 35.
1 Pedis possessio is defined as "foothold; an actual possession," BLACK'S LAw DIcTION-
ARY 1019 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), and as "[a] possession of the foot; a bare foothold or momen-
tary personal presence on land in the lawful possession of another," BALLENTINE'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 917 (3d ed. 1969).
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he is occupying.8 Originally applicable only to the ground in the
immediate area of a prospector's workings,9 pedis possessio rights
are now generally deemed to extend to the boundaries of the claim
a prospector is working, so long as the claim is clearly staked.10 In
recent years, mining industry representatives have argued that rec-
ognition of pedis possessio rights on a claim-by-claim basis no
longer provides adequate protection for investment in mineral ex-
ploration; the low grade of the minerals sought today makes it nec-
essary to mine many claims together, but because the minerals are
buried at great depth, it is too costly to prospect on many claims
simultaneously.1 As a remedy, some courts12 and commentators's
have supported a further liberalization of pedis possessio to pro-
tect neighboring unworked claims.
This comment will review the history of the law related to
pedis possessio, examine the current failings of the doctrine, and
evaluate the likely effects of judicial expansion of the doctrine's
8 See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-48 (1919). See infra notes 42-63 and
accompanying text.
' Gemmell v. Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 335, 72 P. 662, 663 (1903). See also Zollars v. Evans,
5 F. 172, 173 (C.C.D. Colo. 1880) (jury instructions); Armstrong v. Lower, 6 Colo. 581, 582-83
(1883). See generally 1 C. LINDLEY, AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL LANDS
§ 218 (3d ed. 1914).
10 Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 250, 327 P.2d 308, 319-20 (1958). See also Ranchers
Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721 (D. Utah 1965); Geomet
Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58, 601 P.2d 1339, 1342 (1979),
cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). See generally Ladendorff, Enlarging Prediscovery
Rights of Mineral Locators, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 11-14 (1961) (describing the
expansion of pedis possessio from a foothold to a full claim); Waldeck, Discovery Require-
ments and Rights Prior to Discovery on Uranium Claims on the Colorado Plateau, 27
ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REv. 404, 416-18 (1955) (describing two lines of authority on the sub-
ject prior to 1955); Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, Denver attorney, Mineral Law Section of
the Colorado Bar Association 5 (Apr. 8, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review). For a brief discussion of the reasons for the expansion of pedis possessio to a full
claim, see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
" Brief of the Arizona Mining Association as Amicus Curiae in support of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz.
55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief]; Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 14-17, Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz.
55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
2 See MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (D. Wyo. 1971); see also Continen-
tal Oil Co. v. Natrona Serv., Inc., 588 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1978) (approving MacGuire in
dictum).
13 See Forman, Dwyer & Cox, Judicial Uncertainties in Applying the Mining Doctrine
of "Pedis Possessio," 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 467, 474 (1970); Knutson & Morris, supra
note 5, at 566 (by implication); Olson, New Frontiers in Pedis Possessio: MacGuire v. Stur-
gis, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 367, 380-81 (1972); Comment, A Judicial Approach to Updat-
ing the Mining Laws of 1872-Pedis Possessio, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 393-95 (1970).
Pedis Possessio
coverage to neighboring, unworked claims. Finding that judicial ac-
tion would not significantly increase mineral development but
would encourage land speculation and depletion of public lands
available for nonmining uses, the comment concludes that compre-
hensive congressional action is needed instead. Congress should
create a system of permits that grant exclusive exploration rights
to particular land parcels for limited time periods. By so doing,
Congress would give miners the protection they need, encourage
mineral development, and foster a rational land-use program for
national lands.
I. HISTORY
Congress enacted the first federal mining law in 1866,14 when
natural resources seemed unlimited. The law invited citizens to
prospect on public lands and enabled them to acquire legal title to
both the minerals and land within a claim on which they discov-
ered a valuable mineral. 15 In 1870, Congress enacted legislation
supplementing the first mining law; 16 two years later, Congress
amended and consolidated those early laws in the more compre-
hensive General Mining Law of 1872.1' That statute, with minor
changes, is the mining law in force today.'8
Although the Constitution gives Congress power to regulate
the use and disposition of federal land, 9 the General Mining Law
broadly delegated the regulation of mining on public lands to local
authorities. 0 The few specific requirements of the federal law are
as follows: a prospector must discover a valuable mineral before he
enjoys rights against the United States;2' title passes from the
United States to a prospector only after mineral discovery and
4 Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 43, 46,
51, 53 (1976)) (recognizing only lode claims, see supra note 6).
Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 251 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976)).
,6 Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 35-36,
38, 47, 52 (1976)) (adding §§12-17 to Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 43, 46, 51, 53 (1976))). That act gave locators of placer claims, see
supra note 6, the same rights of location and patent as the earlier act gave to locators of
lode claims. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1976)).
'7 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91, amended by Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41
Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1976)).
,' McBroom, supra note 3, at 1060. Subsequent statutes have excluded some important
minerals from prospecting under the General Mining Law. See supra note 1.
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
o See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 28, 53 (1976); infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
2' See 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336
(1963); Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 347 (1919). See also PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW
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upon purchase of a federal deed known as a patent;22 one hundred
dollars' "worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made
during each year" after discovery and before the purchase of a pat-
ent;2 3 and all local regulations must be consistent with the laws of
the United States. 4 Other than these requirements, exploration on
federal lands is to occur "under regulations prescribed by law, and
according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several
mining districts. '' 25 The "miners of each mining district" are also
authorized to make regulations governing location and recorda-
tion,"S provided the regulations comply with the federal require-
ments and are "not in conflict with . . the laws of the State or
Territory in which the district is situated. 2 7
The General Mining Law's reliance on administration by min-
ing districts is perhaps best understood in historical context. In
1872, both federal and state governments in the West were virtu-
ally nonexistent;28 western miners had been governing themselves
since the California gold rush" and had already established a sys-
tem of customs and rules designed to maintain order in the mining
camps.30 In the century since the passage of the General Mining
COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 126. For a discusssion of the discovery requirement, see supra
note 5.
22 30 U.S.C. §§ 29, 37 (1976). The patent price is $2.50/acre for placer claims and $5.00/
acre for lode claims. Id. § 37. After acquiring a patent, a locator owns his claim in fee.
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1877). Except for the transfer of legal title, however, post-
discovery, prepatent rights are identical to patent rights. Id. at 763, 767 (indicating that
after discovery, a claim can be transferred by conveyance, inheritance, or devise); see Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963) (holding that even though mining
claims are unpatented and title to lands is still in the United States, the claims are valid
against the United States if there has been discovery of mineral within the limits of the
claim and other statutory requirements have been met).
2- 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976). The work required each year to protect postdiscovery rights is
known as "assessment work." Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1919).
2- 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 28 (1976).
2-5 Id. § 22.
28 Id.; see supra note 5 (discussing location and recordation and their relation to
discovery).
2.7 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976).
28 See R. BILLINOTON, WESTWARD EXPANSION 615-32 (1949); C. SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A
STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT, 236-40 (1884), reprinted in AMERICA'S FRONTIER
STORY 546-48 (M. Ridge & R. Billington eds. 1969). See generally C. BEARD, CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN HISTORY 1877-1913, at 41-46 (1914); H. BRADLEY, THE UNITED STATES PROM 1865,
at 44-53 (1973); A. NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA 1865-1878, at 101-53
"(1935); F. PAXSON, THE NEW NATION 20-37, 142-61 (1915).
29 See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878) (dictum); R. BILLINGTON, supra note 28,
at 615-32; C. SHINN, supra note 28, at 236-40, reprinted in AMERICA'S FRONTIER STORY at
546-48.
20 Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of Interior Department Proce-
dures, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 186. See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1878) (dic-
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Law, however, state governments have grown and preempted
"mining-districts"' in the administration of federal mining law.3 2
State statutes now govern virtually all aspects of claim location
and recordation."s
Representatives of the mining industry contend that posses-
sory disputes prior to discovery should be resolved according to the
contemporary customs of miners3 ' because the statutory section
mentioning such disputes,35 unlike the section governing location
and recordation, 6 does not mention consistency with state law but
turn) (suggesting that the California gold miners treated discovery as requisite to title and
adhered to a system of pre-discovery rights because of their concern for order and fairness).
Customary rules providing possessory rights allowed unimpeded exploration and minimized
breaches of the peace. See Fiske, Pedis Possessio-Modern Use of an Old Concept, 15
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 181, 186 (1969) (citing Jennison); Olson, supra note 13, at 370-71
(same); Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 19 (same). But see Draft of a Brief of
the Colorado Mining Association that Certiorari Should be Dismissed at 3, Geomet Explora-
tion, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert. dismissed,
448 U.S. 917 (1980) (arguing that miners' codes generally did not regulate possessory rights
prior to discovery) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as Colorado Mining Ass'n Brief Draft].
3, The term "mining district" is used in 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 28 (1976). See supra notes 25-
27 and accompanying text. In United States v. Smith, 11 F. 487, 490-91 (C.C.D. Ohio 1882),
the court defined the term as meaning that "section of country usually designated by name
and described or understood as being confined within certain natural boundaries in which
gold or silver or both are found in paying quantities, and which is worked therefor, under
rules and regulations prescribed by the miners therein."
3 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976), see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, has been inter-
preted as giving states broad regulatory authority. See, e.g., Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,
196 U.S. 119, 126-28 (1905) (Q 28 permits state legislatures to enact regulations supplement-
ing provisions of federal statutes if not inconsistent with them); Lockhart v. Johnson, 181
U.S. 516, 526-28 (1901) (regulations promulgated by the Territory of New Mexico, supple-
mental to and not inconsistent with federal mining laws, were valid and enforceable); Er-
hardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527, 535 (1885) (federal requirements listed in § 28 were not in-
tended to interfere with the rights of states).
All major mining states have statutes supplementing the General Mining Law. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 27.05.010-.25.010 (1962 & Supp. 1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-201 to
-275 (1976 & Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 2001-2708 (West 1972 & Supp.
1981-1982); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 34-1-101 to -54-107 (1973 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§
47-201 to -1611 (1977 & Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §8 82-1-101 to -4-441 (1981); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 513.011-520.270 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-1-1 to -10-4 (1978 & Supp.
1981); OIL Rav. STAT. §§ 516.010-517.990 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-1 to -1-13 (1981);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-101 to -4-305 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
3 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-201 to -222 (1976 & Supp. 1981-1982); COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 34-43-101 to -116 (1973 & Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-101 to -110
(1977 & Supp. 1982).
3' See Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 22; Petition, supra note 11, at 13
n.17 (urging the Court to clarify "the weight that should be accorded the customs of modern
prospectors under this statute [30 U.S.C. § 53] and the flexibility that the various state
legislatures might have to address the issue").
3 30 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
" Id. § 28; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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provides that "each case shall be adjudged by the law of posses-
sion. '3 7 Historically, there has been a close relationship between
miners' customs and judicial resolution of possessory disputes; the
early court cases resolving possessory mining disputes before the
enactment of the General Mining Law essentially adopted the min-
ers' customs,3 8 forming them into the doctrine of pedis possessio.3 9
Later courts continued to apply those possessory rules when imple-
menting the Mining Law because judicial protection of pedis pos-
sessio rights, facilitating peace and order and providing miners
with prediscovery security, was compatible with the statute.40 De-
spite its historical origins, however, the doctrine of pedis possessio
is not bound to the current customs of miners; it is a state common
law doctrine that is capable of developing independently of miners'
customs.
4 1
II. THE DOCTRINE OF Pedis Possessio
A. The Doctrine in its Traditional Form
The classic enunciation of the doctrine of pedis possessio ap-
pears in dicta in the United States Supreme Court's 1919 opinion
in Union Oil Co. v. Smith. 2 The Court stated that a prospector
actively searching for minerals in the public domain is entitled to
protection of the land he occupies against forcible, fraudulent,
37 30 U.S.C. § 53 (1976). The phrase "law of possession" was interpreted to mean "local
rules and customs of miners" in Rico-Aspen Consol. Mining Co. v. Enterprise Mining Co.,
53 F. 321, 324 (C.C.D. Colo. 1892), "rev'd on other grounds, 66 F. 200 (8th Cir. 1895), aff'd,
167 U.S. 108 (1897). The court, however, went on to recognize the authority of states to
regulate possessory disputes, stating that "the general policy of congress ... [has been] to
recognize and establish the usages and customs of miners in mining districts, and the laws
of the several states relating to such matters." Id. (emphasis added). See also Colorado
Mining Ass'n Brief Draft, supra note 30, at 6 (arguing "law of possession" means state com-
mon law).
38 Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1879) (dictum); 1 C. LINDLEY, supra note 9,§§ 44-46. But see Swenson, Sources and Evolution of American Mining Law, in 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING § 1.9 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation ed. 1981) ("[a] review of
... California cases between 1848 and 1866 does not reveal that the customs of miners
played a very significant role in the judicial law making process"); Colorado Mining Ass'n
Brief Draft, supra note 30, at 3-4 (indicating that state courts recognized possessory rights
despite the failure of miners' rules to do so).
39 The earliest reported mining cases to use the term pedis possessio were Attwood v.
Fricot, 17 Cal. 37, 43 (1860); English v. Johnson, 17 Cal. 107, 116 (1860); Hess v. Winder, 30
Cal. 349, 355, 358 (1866).
" Fiske, supra note 30, at 186.
41 See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 348 (1919) (dictum) (stating that posses-
sory rights may'derive from "the authority of the mining states to regulate the possession of
the public lands in the interest of peace and good order").
" 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
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clandestine, or surreptitious intrusions.43 The Court identified the
essential requirements for pedis possessio protection as continued
actual occupancy of a claim, diligent work directed toward making
a discovery, and exclusion of others.44 If any of these elements is
missing, no protection is provided by the doctrine, and the initial
prospector is left without special rights against his competitors.45
1. Persistent and Diligent Work Toward Discovery. Persis-
tent and diligent work toward mineral discovery traditionally has
been required on each claim for which protection is sought.46 Satis-
faction of the work requirement has almost invariably consisted of
actual digging or drilling on the specific claim sought to be pro-
tected.47 Acts of location such as posting, marking, monumenting,
staking, and recording are not considered work leading toward dis-
covery.48 Similarly, patrolling a claim, watching over it, or placing
signs, fences, or caretakers on it does not satisfy the work require-
ment,49 although such activity might help meet the occupancy and
exclusion requirements."
2. Actual Occupancy. Closely related to the work require-
ment is the requirement described in Union Oil as "continued ac-
tual occupancy. '51 Subsequent court decisions have reiterated that
13 Id. at 346-48. Although the Court asserted that pedis possessio protection exists '"at
least for a reasonable time," id. at 347, no reported cases discuss what amount of time would
be reasonable, see Fiske, supra note 30, at 191.
44 Union Oil, 249 U.S. at 346-48.
Fiske, supra note 30, at 191, 197.
46 See, e.g., Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721-23
(D. Utah 1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58, 601
P.2d 1339, 1342 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M.
234, 238, 327 P.2d 308, 311 (1958). See also Fiske, supra note 30, at 195; Knutson & Morris,
supra note 5, at 551; Sherwood & Greer, Possessory Interests in Wyoming Mining Claims,
4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 337, 346 (1969); Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, at 4.
But see Olson, supra note 13, at 374-75 (claiming the restrictive statements in Adams and
Ranchers Exploration are dicta).
" Fiske, supra note 30, at 195.
" Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 718 (D. Utah
1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 56, 601 P.2d
1339, 1340 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Borgwardt v. McKittrick Oil Co., 164
Cal. 650, 660-61, 130 P. 417, 420-21 (1913); New England & Coalinga Oil Co. v. Congdon,
152 Cal. 211, 215, 92 P. 180, 181 (1907); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 248-50, 327 P.2d
308, 318-19 (1958); Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 24-25, 95 P. 849, 855-56 (1908).
"' Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 718 (D. Utah
1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 56, 601 P.2d
1339, 1340 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); New England & Coalinga Oil Co. v.
Congdon, 152 Cal. 211, 214-15, 92 P. 180, 181 (1907); Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 24-25, 95
P. 849, 855-56 (1908).
80 Fiske, supra note 30, at 194.
1 249 U.S. at 348.
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pedis possessio occupancy must be "actual," 2 not constructive. 3
Because the United States retains title until after discovery, 54 the
common law principle of priority based upon "color of title"55 is
not relevant in possessory actions under the General Mining Law."'
Pedis possessio doctrine does allow constructive possession in the
limited sense that a prospector may assert pedis possessio rights
over the full area of a claim even though he is only working on a
portion of the claim.57 Until recently,58 however, it has been as-
sumed that pedis possessio rights cannot extend beyond the
boundaries of a claim.59
3. The Exclusion Requirement. Pedis possessio protects a
prospector against only forcible, fraudulent, clandestine, or surrep-
52 Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1919) (dictum); Hanson v. Craig, 170 F. 62, 65
(9th Cir. 1909); Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 724 (D.
Utah 1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58-59, 601
P.2d 1339, 1342-43 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M.
234, 246-47, 327 P.2d 308, 317 (1958); Granlick v. Johnston, 29 Wyo. 349, 360-61, 213 P. 98,
101 (1923). Cases decided prior to Union Oil also implied such a requirement. See, e.g., Belk
v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1881) (dictum); McLemore v. Express Oil Co., 158 Cal.
559, 561, 112 P. 59, 60 (1910). Some commentators have concluded from these cases that
pedis possessio occupancy must be "continuous," Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note
10, at 4, and "physical," Fiske, supra note 30, at 191-92; Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra
note 10, at 4 & Annotated Outline at 3.
11 Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 724-25 (D. Utah
1965); Mountain States Dev. Co., 50 Pub. Lands Dec. 348, 351 (1924); Geomet Exploration,
Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 57-58, 601 P.2d 1339, 1341-42 (1979), cert.
dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Fiske, supra note 30, at 192; Ladendorff, Proposed Legisla-
tion to Enlarge Prediscovery Rights of Mineral Locators, 1 NAT. RESOURCES J. 76, 80 (1961).
Contra Kanab Uranium Corp. v. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc., 227 F.2d 434 (10th Cir.
1955). Kanab has been widely criticized by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Ranchers
Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721-23 (D. Utah 1965); Fiske,
supra note 30, at 208; Knutson & Morris, supra note 5, at 553 n.102; Ladendorff, supra note
10, at 17, 21; Olson, supra note 13, at 379. For a comparison of Kanab and Ranchers Explo-
ration, see Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra note 13, at 469-72.
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51 Under the doctrine of "color of title," an adverse possessor claiming valid title to a
large tract is deemed to be in possession of the whole tract, although he actually occupies
only a small part of the area in question. To invoke the doctrine, however, the adverse
possessor must be able to claim "what purports to be valid muniment of title." 4 H. TiF-
FANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1155, at 815-16 (3d ed. 1975).
" See Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721-23 (D.
Utah 1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp. 124 Ariz. 55, 56-57, 601
P.2d 1339, 1340-41 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
'7 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
59 Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721 (D. Utah
1965); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 123 Ariz. 55, 57-58, 601 P.2d
1339, 1341-42 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234,
247, 327 P.2d 308, 317 (1958); Fiske, supra note 30, at 195; Sherwood & Greer, supra note
46, at 346; Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, at 5.
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titious entries; 0 if a claimant allows a rival to enter peaceably,
without deceit or secrecy, the claimant loses his superior status."s
Accordingly, a prospector seeking pedis possessio protection must
actively deny entry to rivals.2 Whether this requirement is met
does not depend upon whether a prospector has or has not granted
permission to rivals to enter; because federal lands are open to all
citizens for prospecting, no permission is necessary.63
60 Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1919) (dictum); Fiske, supra note 30, at
196. An entry is clandestine when made at night or in the temporary absence of the prior
occupant. See Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Hane Oil Co., 98 F. 673, 680-81 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1899);
Springer v. Southern Pac. Co., 67 Utah 590, 601, 248 P. 819, 824 (1926); Davis v. Dennis, 43
Wash. 54, 59, 85 P. 1079, 1080 (1906); Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, Anno-
tated Outline at 8. An entry is forcible when made against vigorous physical resistance.
Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 247, 327 P.2d 308, 317 (1958). An entry is fraudulent if it
is made under the guise of a non-adverse motive. Fiske, supra note 30, at 198.
After mineral discovery, a prospector is protected against entries made in bad faith, i.e.,
made by one who has notice of the prior locator's claim. Prior to discovery, it traditionally
has not been considered bad faith to go upon a tract knowing that it is claimed by someone
else. Id. at 202-03. Prior locators have encouraged the courts to expand the "bad faith de-
fense" to conflicts involving pedis possessio rights because tainting an intruder's motives is
easier than complying with the requirements of pedis possessio. Knutson & Morris, supra
note 5, at 555-56. In fact, some recent cases have applied the bad faith defense quite liber-
ally to prediscovery situations. See Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration &
Dev., Inc., 468 F.2d 547, 550 (10th Cir. 1972) (knowledge of the existence of a claim imposes
a duty on the subsequent occupant "to make inquiry to determine the extent of the adverse
party's work"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Co., 88 Ariz. 182,
189-90, 354 P.2d 40, 45 (1960). But see Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co.,
248 F. Supp. 708, 731 (D. Utah 1965) ("knowledge of an adverse claim does not of itself
indicate bad faith and may not even be evidence of it unless accompanied by some improper
means to defeat such claim"); Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124
Ariz. 55, 59, 601 P.2d 1339, 1343 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Adams v.
Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 246, 327 P.2d 308, 316 (1958).
The argument against liberal application of the bad faith defense in prediscovery situa-
tions has been stated as follows:
Since pedis possessio protects against not only forcible and fraudulent but also clan-
destine entries (such as those by night and those made in the temporary absence of the
prior locator), there is little need or justification for case law which prohibits rival loca-
tions on the ground that the subsequent locator knew of the existence of a prior loca-
tion. The legal incentive for the senior locator to make a prompt discovery is vitiated,
since he may hide behind a paper location-and the remaining economic incentive is
insufficient, since all too often claims are held for profit by sale rather than develop-
ment. There is no reason or justification for protecting the "possession" of those whose
indolence or absence has led others to believe that their claims have been abandoned.
Knutson & Morris, supra note 5, at 556.
6' Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1920).
42 Id. The manner in which the occupant must resist a rival is not clear. Fiske, supra
note 30, at 202, claims "[tlhe law does not require violent self-help, so any reasonable visible
or verbal protestation should suffice." Another commentator has noted, however, that "the
cases are replete where telephone calls and threats of trespass actions were insufficient."
Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, at 4.
" See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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B. Contemporary Problems with the Doctrine
Representatives of the mining industry64 and some legal com-
mentators 5 contend that traditional pedis possessio rules no
longer adequately protect prospectors' investment in exploration
because the mining techniques employed today are of necessity far
different from the methods for which the doctrine was designed.
When pedis possessio was judicially adopted in the 1860's it was
fairly easy to discover gold and silver, the principal objects of pros-
pecting, close to the surface.6 6 Limited pedis possessio protection,
securing only the area immediately adjacent to a prospector's
workings, presented no hardship because discovery was quick,
easy, and highly remunerative. 7 When miners began searching for
deposits hidden further below the surface, however, they sought
additional protection to offset the risks and expenses involved in
deep drilling. 8 Judicial expansion of pedis possessio protection to
the boundaries of a claim around the turn of the century 9 satisfied
the miners' needs; prospectors could afford to limit their searches
to one claim at a time because the deposits they sought, once un-
covered, occurred in rich veins and dense pools, providing high re-
turns for investments. 0
The mineral deposits sought today, however, are neither easily
discoverable nor rich in nature. They are covered by layers of over-
burden and, when discovered, tend to be of low grade.7 1 Because
processing low grade ore requires immense plants and investments,
it is most economical for miners to locate claims in large groups or
blocks encompassing hundreds of claims. 2 Because deep drilling is
" Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 11-13; Petition, supra note 11, at 14-
17; Public Lands Committee of the American Mining Congress, The Mining Industry and
The Public Lands 17 (Jan. 11, 1968) (unpublished statement on behalf of the American
Mining Congress before the Public Land Law Review Commission) (on file with The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as American Mining Congress].
65 Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra note 13, at 474; Knutson & Morris, supra note 5, at
566 (by implication); Olson, supra note 13, at 380-81; Comment, supra note 13, at 393-95.
66 See Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 7-8; Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra
note 13, at 468-69; Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 3.
67 Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 7-8.
' See Fiske, supra note 30, at 188; Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 3, 12-15.
6' Field v. Grey, 1 Ariz. 404, 408-09, 25 P. 793, 794 (1881); Miller v. Chrisman, 140 Cal.
440, 450-51, 73 P. 1083, 1086 (1903), aft'd, 197 U.S. 313 (1905). See supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text.
"0 See Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 8; Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra
note 13, at 469.
11 Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 8-13; Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra
note 13, at 469.
72 Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 7-9; Knutson & Morris, supra note 5,
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time consuming and extremely costly, however, "[i]t is simply im-
possible . . . to instantaneously and simultaneously possess and
explore hundreds of separate claims by occupancy. 7 3 Unable to
meet the traditional pedis possessio requirements by occupying
and exploring each claim, the modern miner is left without pedis
possessio protection for most of the claims in his block.74 Conse-
quently, once there is any hint of mineral discovery, a miner's com-
petitors may reap the benefits of his exploration work by quickly
grabbing the neighboring unprotected claims. This problem is par-
ticularly acute when the largest seam is found some distance from
what appeared at first to be the most promising location.7 5
In recognition of this problem, miners customarily adhere to
"gentlemen's agreements" which respect the land positions staked
out by others regardless of whether the land is actually being
worked or occupied.7  Although such agreements give protection
over and above that of pedis possessio, they are not legally bind-
ing, and some recent cases indicate the risk of reliance on this cus-
tom.7 7 Many of the critics of traditional pedis possessio doctrine 8
argue that if mineral development is to remain the purpose of the
General Mining Law79 to which pedis possessio is an adjunct,
courts must once again adopt the customs of miners as law80 and
recognize pedis possessio rights on a group, or block, basis.
III. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF Pedis Possessio
In MacGuire v. Sturgis,8 ' the United States District Court for
at 519-24.
73 Fiske, supra note 30, at 209-10.
74 Knutson & Morris, supra note 5, at 521 (citing "'Nonfuel Mineral Resources and the
Public Lands,' IV Mineral Land Systems 813-14 (Univ. of Ariz. 1969)").
71 This often is the case in uranium mining, for example. See, e.g., Smaller v. Leach,
136 Colo. 297, 306, 316 P.2d 1030, 1036 (1957).
7' Speech by Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, at 8.
71 E.g., Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 56, 601
P.2d 1339, 1340 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). Geomet Exploration did not
respect Lucky Mc Uranium's land positions, but instead located seven claims on a portion of
the two hundred Lucky claims. This forced Lucky Mc Uranium to demonstrate in court that
it deserved exclusive mining rights to the land because it had either made a discovery, see
supra note 5, or satisfied the elements of pedis possessio, see supra notes 46-63 and accom-
panying text.
78 See sources cited supra notes 64-65.
7, See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1976) (added to
the mining law in 1970 to reaffirm the federal government's encouragement of mineral
development).
SO Cf. supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
1, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971). The case arose under diversity jurisdiction. Dis-
putes over location and pedis possessio rights do not give rise to federal question jurisdic-
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the District of Wyoming provided a miner with extraordinary pre-
discovery protection by extending pedis possessio coverage to un-
worked claims proximate to worked claims. Alluding to economic
justifications, the court substantially liberalized traditional pedis
possessio requirements.2 The Supreme Court of Arizona has re-
jected MacGuire outright in Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky
Mc Uranium Corp.,5 but the Tenth Circuit has spoken approv-
ingly of MacGuire 4 and has expressed dissatisfaction with the lim-
ited protection afforded miners by current mining laws.8 5 Hence,
although MacGuire does not necessarily represent a trend in the
law, it is clear that courts are looking critically at the law concern-
ing the prediscovery period, and MacGuire represents the view
that judicial modification of pedis possessio is necessary.
A. MacGuire v. Sturgis
The district court in MacGuire applied greatly liberalized
standards for the pedis possessio requirements of actual work and
occupancy, but apparently applied the traditional exclusion re-
quirement. The court awarded plaintiff MacGuire exclusive posses-
sion of a group of 1785 uranium lode claims" even though he was
engaged in work toward discovery on only some of those claims.87
tion unless they involve the federal requirements discussed supra notes 21-24 and accompa-
nying text. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900) (although what is
currently 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) gives states the ability to supplement the General Mining
Law, that section does not incorporate state regulations into federal law). For a discussion of
Shoshone and the federal jurisdiction questions it raises, see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 370-73 (2d ed. 1975).
82 MacGuire, 347 F. Supp. at 584-85.
83 124 Ariz. 55, 57-58, 601 P.2d 1339, 1341-42 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917
(1980). It also appears that the expansive view of pedis possessio taken by MacGuire is
inconsistent with the three previous decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court on the sub-
ject. See Sparks v. Mount, 29 Wyo. 1, 207 P. 1099 (1922); Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.
856 (1908); Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908); Knutson & Morris, supra note 5,
at 573. See also Sherwood & Greer, supra note 46, at 346 (discussing Wyoming law prior to
MacGuire). Defenders of the MacGuire decision argue that the restrictive cases of the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court should not be binding because they were all decided prior to 1925,
before modern exploration techniques were developed. Petition, supra note 11, at 8 n.6.
84 Continental Oil Co. v. Natrona Serv., Inc., 588 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1978).
85 See Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Dev., Inc., 468 F.2d 547
(10th Cir. 1972) (applying a liberal version of the bad-faith defense in prediscovery situa-
tions, discussed supra note 60); Kanab Uranium Corp. v. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc.,
227 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1955) '(indicating prior locators should be able to rely on the princi-
ple of "color of title," discussed supra note 55).
8' See MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580, 581-82 (D. Wyo. 1971); Olson, supra note
13, at 368 n.4.
87 MacGuire, 347 F. Supp. at 584-85.
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As a general proposition, the decision suggests that the work re-
quirement for a group of claims will be satisfied if a work program
is in effect for the area claimed and if a significant number of ex-
ploratory holes are systematically drilled."s
By modifying the work required for pedis possessio protec-
tion, MacGuire also relaxed the traditional occupancy require-
ment. The decision would allow a prospector who actually occupies
some claims to enjoy pedis possessio rights on unoccupied neigh-
boring claims as well, so long as the area claimed is reasonable in
size and all the claims share a similar geologic structure.8 9
The court's disposition of the exclusion requirement is less
clear. When evaluating the relative merits of the MacGuire and
Sturgis positions, the court relied on MacGuire's efforts to exclude
Sturgis from the contested area.90 This suggests that a prospector
relying on MacGuire would still have to exclude others from all the
claims he seeks to protect even though he is not occupying or
working most of them. Although it may seem incongruous to pre-
serve the duty to exclude while relaxing the occupancy and work
requirements, it is quite possible that.eliminating the exclusion re-
quirement would have made the decision inconsistent with the
General Mining Law.91
B. Limitations of the MacGuire Approach
Because MacGuire's approach is responsive to current western
mining economics, one would expect it to encourage mineral devel-
opment. In practice, however, few benefits and substantial harm
can be anticipated if the rule is applied in other cases. The Mac-
" Id.
" See id.
"Id. at 583-84.
1, MacGuire's grant of possessory rights to land on which no minerals were discovered
has been criticized as inconsistent with the requirement in 30 U.S.C. § 23 that discovery
precede legal title. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery re-
quirement); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v.
Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917
(1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) (concluding that "[r]ecognition
of such broad possessory rights is foreclosed by the governing federal mining law"). See also
Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1919) (dictum) (interpreting an assessment
work statute to allow possessory control over contiguous unworked claims would be a "radi-
cal departure from the previous policy of the mining laws," id. at 352); Fiske, supra note 30,
at 183-84 ("Pedis possessio has no independent existence or purpose, and no permanent
consequence of its own .... It is no more than a device to implement the General Mining
Law.... [T]he scope and operation of pedis possessio must be consistent with the existing
principles of the General Mining Law." Id. at 184).
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Guire rule probably will not increase mineral development and will
divert public lands from the uses intended by Congress.
1. MacGuire's Effect on Mineral Development. A judicial ex-
pansion of pedis possessio doctrine patterned after MacGuire will
not likely lead to additional mineral development for two reasons.
First, it will encourage land speculation and withholding land from
production. Second, it would leave unchanged some aspects of cur-
rent law that discourage investment in mining.
Under traditional pedis possessio requirements, a miner can
control a claim only if he is actively working toward discovery of
minerals.2 MacGuire would allow a miner to control large num-
bers of claims without work or cost, so long as the claims are near a
few worked claims.9 3 Such cost-free control would give miners the
opportunity to claim far more land than they can work, thereby
reducing the amount of land producing minerals.94 The hoarding of
public lands for speculative purposes is already a significant na-
tional problem.9 5 Widespread judicial acceptance of MacGuire's
liberalization of pedis possessio rules would exacerbate that prob-
lem, thus frustrating both the General Mining Law's overall pur-
pose of increasing mineral development and the discovery require-
ment's specific purpose of preventing speculation. 6
Advocates of an expansion of pedis possessio protection recog-
nize the possibility of increased speculation and decreased mineral
production 7 but maintain that judicial limits on pedis possessio
expansion, such as those set forth in MacGuire, can minimize that
risk.98 MacGuire's guidelines, however, are vague and very difficult
9 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
9' See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
See Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58, 601 P.2d
1339, 1342 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234,
247, 327 P.2d 308, 317 (1958); Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 21-22.
9 See Uranium Lode Mining Claims on Federal Lands: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversights and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977) (testimony of John W. MacGuire) (almost 25%
of United States land likely to contain uranium may now be tied up by speculators) [herein-
after cited as Hearings]; Knutson & Morris, supra note 5, at 556 ("all too often claims are
held for profit by sale rather than development").
The general purpose of the Mining Law is to increase mineral development, see
supra notes 2, 79 and accompanying text; the specific purpose of the discovery requirement
of 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976), see supra note 5 and accompanying text, appears to have been to
prevent speculation, see 43 C.F.R. § 3841.3-1 ("[tlhe object of [30 U.S.C. § 23] is evidently
to prevent the appropriation of presumed mineral ground for speculative purposes").
97 Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 13; Olson, supra note 13, at 380.
98 Arizona Mining Ass'n Brief, supra note 11, at 29-38; Olson, supra note 13, at 380-81.
The MacGuire court indicated that a prospector will be entitled to exclusive possession over
a group of claims only if the geology is fairly uniform throughout the area claimed, the size
1040 [49:1026
1982] Pedis Possessio 1041
to enforce.9 9 The court discussed a "reasonable" area,100 but it did
not say what an unreasonable number of acres would be. MacGuire
itself involved 1785 claims, 01 an extremely large area. Although
the MacGuire rule requires a miner to devise a work program for
the entire area he claims, it does not detail the contents of such a
plan. 102 Moreover, MacGuire does not specify whether there must
be a real intent to follow the work plan,103 or, if such an intent is
required, how a court could tell whether it existed. Finally, Mac-
Guire stresses the economic impracticability of developing miner-
als only on actively worked claims, but it does not distinguish im-
practicability from mere inconvenience to the miner.1 04 In sum, the
judicial limits set in MacGuire are too vague and powerless to be a
meaningful check on speculation and the withdrawal of land from
mineral production.10 5
MacGuire also leaves intact two aspects of current law that
inhibit mineral development. First, a prospector acquires no rights
against the United States under the General Mining Law until he
discovers a mineral.10 8 As a result, the government can dispose of
of the area claimed is reasonable, an overall work program is in effect for the area claimed, a
significant number of exploratory holes have been drilled systematically, and the nature of
the mineral claimed makes it economically impracticable to develop the mineral only on
those claims where the prospector is actually present and working. MacGuire, 347 F. Supp.
at 584-85. The court also relied on the fact that "the discovery (validation) work referred to
in Wyo. Stat. § 30-6 (1957) is completed." Id. at 584. This is irrelevant for purposes of
establishing pedis possessio. See Olson, supra note 13, at 368 n.5.
"9 Contra Olson, supra note 13, at 380.
o MacGuire, 347 F. Supp. at 584.
,o See id. at 581-82; Olson, supra note 13, at 368 n.4. Cf. Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v.
Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 56, 601 P.2d 1339, 1340 (1979), cert. dismissed, 448
U.S. 917 (1980), which involved 200 claims and 4000 acres. One commentator has suggested
that the immodest size of the claim block in Geomet, though smaller than in MacGuire, was
one reason why the court did not grant pedis possessio protection to the plaintiff. Speech by
Stephen D. Alfers, supra note 10, at 16.
102 See MacGuire, 347 F. Supp. at 584-85. The decision neither sets quality standards
for work plans nor insists that the scheme be economically or technically feasible. MacGuire
also does not indicate whether the plan must be in writing. See id.
103 See id. Although MacGuire stipulates that a work program must be diligently pur-
sued, the facts of the case show that work on only 150 claims was sufficient for possessory
control of over 1785 claims. See id. at 583.
104 Id. at 584-85.
"00 See Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58, 601
P.2d 1339, 1342 (1979) (criticizing MacGuire as "laden with extreme difficulties of determin-
ing over how large an area and for how long one might be permitted to exclude others"),
cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). See also Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 21-22 ("[T]here
must be some limitations as to time, area, and diligence. Without such limitations, the doc-
trine of pedis possessio becomes a tool for speculators, permitting the preemption of large
areas of public domain and the frustration of the policy of the general mining law.").
10" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the land on which he is working in any manner it chooses through-
out the prediscovery period. 10 7 The possibility of adverse govern-
ment action adds to the inherent risk of loss during mineral explo-
ration. This is especially true today when mineral discovery is a
long, hard, costly process. 10 8
Second, because MacGuire did not eliminate the pedis posses-
sio exclusion requirement,10 9 a prospector proceeding under its
holding still must prevent rivals from entering any of the claims he
seeks to protect. Guarding against peaceable entries over a large
block of claims involves considerable expenditures. Rather than in-
creasing mineral discoveries and production, however, such ex-
penditures would only preserve possessory rights. This undercuts
the production goals of MacGuire and the General Mining Law. In
sum, MacGuire's failure to provide adequate protection and its en-
couragement of speculation ill serve the goal of increasing mineral
development.
2. Withdrawal of Public Land from Legitimate Mining and
Nonmining Uses. A MacGuire-like expansion of pedis possessio
would foster abuse of the mining laws, thus reducing the number
of acres available for legitimate mining and nonmining uses. Under
the General Mining Law, a miner can prospect for minerals on any
unappropriated public land without regard to other land uses." 0
During the prediscovery period, pedis possessio rights allow a
miner to exclude other land uses to the extent that they interfere
with his exploration."' Once mining begins, it tends to displace
other uses because mining is largely incompatible with land uses
such as recreation, watershed protection, and conservation." 2 More
formally, once a prospector discovers a valuable mineral, he ob-
tains property rights good against the United States"3 that allow
him to exclude all other uses of his claim regardless of whether
they interfere with mining.114
Miners often acquire postdiscovery rights illegitimately by
107 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 126.
108 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
'09 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
110 See STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT-A TIME
FOR CHANGE? 8 (1971).
" Fiske, supra note 30, at 198.
112 See STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 110, at 8, 18; McBroom,
supra note 3, at 1066 ("it would be facetious to say that there is no conflict between mining
and recreation or that mining is compatible with recreation").
113 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
14 See McBroom, supra note 3, at 1064-66.
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filing false affidavits of discovery ' 15 and of assessment work."86
These rights allow them to exclude legitimate uses of public lands,
even though they have not met the General Mining Law's discov-
ery requirement." 7 Only the United States or a subsequent locator
can challenge the validity of a miner's claim," 8 but the government
rarely challenges claims unless it needs the land for other pur-
poses." ' Under traditional pedis possessio rules, a subsequent lo-
115 See supra note 5 (noting, in paragraph three, that courts have long allowed miners
who have not discovered minerals to locate and record claims despite federal and state stat-
utes that require discovery to precede both location and recordation).
16 Hearings, supra note 95, passim; Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 4, at 285 (noting
that "perjury convictions for filing such fraudulent statements are hardly common"). See
supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing assessment work requirement).
'27 See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS 57 (1957) ("Mining claims cover a
much larger area of federal land than does actual mineral development; and these claims
often limit, if not exclude, other uses of the land."). See also id. at 80:
[T]he mining laws have been subject to many abuses and have frequently been used as
a subterfuge for obtaining control of land that would not be available under laws or
regulations for the purposes sought. The Forest Service has estimated that only 15
percent of all mining claims that went to patent, and only a very small fraction of those
not patented, have been used for commercial mining operations. The others have been
used for grazing, timber harvest (permitted after patent), summer homes, or for many
other purposes.
218 See Comment, Preservation and Strategic Mineral Development in Alaska: Con-
gress Writes a New Equation, 12 ENVTL. L. 137, 149 (1981). The United States can always
contest the validity of a claim on the ground that no valuable mineral has been discovered.
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1920); STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW So-
cigry, supra note 110, at 6. Traditionally, failure to do the assessment work required by 30
U.S.C. § 28 (1976), supra note 23, entitled other prospectors to relocate the claim but did
not allow the Department of the Interior to cancel the claims. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado
Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306
(1930). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances the federal
government can contest the validity of a claim for failure to do proper assessment work.
Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
The Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), appears to give the Interior Department more power. The law requires
claimants to file, both locally and with the Bureau of Land Management, either a "notice of
intention to hold" or an affidavit of assessment work. Id. § 1744(a). Failure to file such
instruments "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining
claim." Id. § 1744(c). Filing such an instrument "by itself shall not render valid any claim
which would not be otherwise valid under applicable law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as a waiver of the assessment and other requirements of such law." Id. § 1744(d).
"I Strauss, supra note 30, at 192; Comment, supra note 118, at 149; see also STANFORD
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SocIETY, supra note 110, at 6. In general, the federal government has
been hesitant to challenge false affidavits, preferring to encourage prospectors to come onto
public lands not needed for another public use. Comment, supra note 118, at 149.
If it should become apparent that massive new speculation is taking place, the govern-
ment might take action. Because a miner can go back and stake another claim if his initial
claim is declared invalid, however, it might not be worthwhile for the Interior Department
to change its current practice, even in the face of massive speculation. If the Department
does not change its current practice, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), see supra
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cator has an incentive to show that a prior locator has failed to
comply with the discovery or assessment work requirements, be-
cause the subsequent locator can obtain rights to valuable minerals
by demonstrating that his claim is superior.120 Under the Mac-
Guire standard, however, it is virtually impossible for a subsequent
locator to establish a superior claim: because MacGuire liberally
grants pedis possessio protection to vast areas, the prior locator
will almost always be able to demonstrate the subsequent locator's
entry violated his pedis possessio rights. 21
Withotit incentives to bring suit, subsequent locators will
bring fewer challenges. Without such challenges, the number of
fraudulent claims will increase unchecked. Congress intended that
miners have easy access to public land for the purpose of min-
ing. 22 In the absence of mining, Congress has provided for other
uses of the public's land.1 23 By making it easier for individuals who
have not actually made a discovery to assert postdiscovery rights,
which include the right to exclude nonmining uses, the MacGuire
decision will divert public land from the uses intended by
Congress.
note 118, will not ensure the performance of assessment work because miners will simply file
a "notice of intention to hold" as allowed by § 1744(a).
It would seem that the 1976 Act must be coupled with a more aggressive police-
man-role for the Department, in the form of contests under the post-Hickel v. Oil
Shale Corp. regulation [43 C.F.R. § 3851.3(a) (1979)], or it must be conceded that the
1976 Act constitutes a mere notice-to-the-government exercise which will have sub-
stance only where the land located has been withdrawn or if failure to comply with the
1976 Act... can be relied upon by a third party relocator to defeat the prior locator in
possession.
Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 4, at 286.
2 In possessory disputes between prospectors, the prospector who meets the three re-
quirements of pedis possessio obtains possession, regardless of who entered the land first.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
121 Under the MacGuire rule, it is not necessary for the prior locator to work and oc-
cupy each claim to obtain pedis possessio rights, so long as he fulfills his duty to exclude.
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. That another prospector meets the tradi-
tional pedis possessio requirements, therefore, will be to no avail. Entry on the claim
against the prior locator's active resistance is an infringement of his possessory rights under
MacGuire; it defeats the subsequent locator's claim.
121 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976) (providing that national forests "shall be ad-
ministered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes"
so long as such administration does not "affect the use or administration of mineral re-
sources," id. § 528). Cf. 30 U.S.C. § 612(a) (providing mining claims shall not be used for
nonmining uses); Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 4, at 218 (" 'The purpose of [§ 612(a)] is to
permit multiple use of the surface resources of our public lands -. '" (quoting S. REP.
No. 554, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1955))).
C. The Propriety of Judicial Action
Judicial action providing miners with additional prediscovery
protection would be advantageous and compatible with the pur-
poses of the General Mining Law"" if court action would not lead
to land speculation and depletion of public land available for legit-
imate uses. The MacGuire decision is deficient because it neither
provides miners with adequate protection nor places sufficient lim-
its on speculation and private domination of public lands.1 1 5
These problems, however, cannot be attributed solely to the
failings of that court's opinion. Courts cannot protect miners
against peaceable entries126 or adverse federal government alloca-
tions1 27 prior to discovery; providing such protection would entail
amending the General Mining Law, which only Congress can do.
More fundamentally, courts are not designed to effect the
kinds of broad policy reforms that are required once pedis posses-
sio protection is extended to land beyond the clear line marked by
the boundary of a claim being worked. 12 8 Industrywide acreage and
time limits are the best way to ensure against land speculation and
the restriction of nonmining uses.129 Such limits would also permit
the mining industry to engage in long-term planning; miners could
rely on an objective standard and not be concerned with subjective
definitions of "reasonable" in determining which claims are pro-
tected.130 Industrywide regulation, however, should be based on an
extensive inquiry into the nature of the industry. Legislatures are
" See supra notes 2, 79, and accompanying text; Fiske, supra note 30, at 184 (quoted
supra note 91).
118 See supra notes 92-123 and accompanying text.
1,1 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
118 The traditional pedis possessio approach of requiring actual occupancy and work on
each claim, see supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text, makes it easy to identify the
limits of pedis possessio rights. Once pedis possessio is expanded beyond the boundaries of
a claim, courts are faced with the tough questions of how large an area and for how long a
period one ought to be permitted to exclude others without actual work or occupancy. See
Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 58, 601 P.2d 1339, 1342
(1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
"I See supra note 105. Speculation is more difficult if the amount of land a miner is
allowed to control without work roughly equals the amount of land he can mine economi-
cally. Similarly, limiting the length of time the miner can control the land without work
would be an inducement to develop the mineral content. See infra notes 143-50 and accom-
panying text.
11o Cf. supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing the vague and subjective
standards in MacGuire); infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing planning
problems caused by the multitude of state laws).
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better able to perform this sort of inquiry than are courts;"' courts
are constrained to consider only the facts of the particular contro-
versy before them." 2
Case-by-case determinations ill serve miners and the public.
Miners need uniform rules for planning purposes 33 and the public
has an interest in coherent national land use policies. Although
prediscovery protection should be increased, courts are not the ap-
propriate institution to do so.
IV. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
It is often stated that mining law needs to be reformed. T13 This
comment has demonstrated that courts are ill suited to undertake
that task. The alternatives to judicial tinkering are either state or
federal legislation. This part discusses why federal action is prefer-
able and outlines a proposal for a permit system to replace pedis
possessio law.
A. The Importance of National Policies
Each mining state has laws that regulate mining and supple-
ment federal law. 3 5 Conceivably, state legislatures could expand
prediscovery rights to suit contemporary needs. Unlike state
courts, state legislatures have the capacity to gather the informa-
tion necessary for expanding prediscovery rights while imposing
limits that can control speculation and illicit domination of public
land.138 State legislatures can also detail stringent work plan re-
quirements more easily than can state courts. Like state courts,
however, state legislatures cannot amend the General Mining Law
to protect miners against peaceable entries and adverse federal
government allocations prior to discovery. Equally important, if
131 See generally D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 353-81 (1978); Stewart & Sun-
stein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1269-70, 1273-74 (1982).
132 D. HORowrrz, supra note 131, at 17-21.
133 See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
'" See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 124; Forman, Dwyer &
Cox, supra note 13, at 473-74; Hagenstein, Changing an Anachronism: Congress and The
General Mining Law of 1872, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 480, 488-93 (1973); Ladendorff, supra
note 10, at 25-33; Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Law in an Atomic Age: A Case for Re-
form, 27 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 375, 380-92 (1955); Olson, supra note 13, at 381; Com-
ment, supra note 13, at 393-95. See also McBroom, supra note 3, at 1066; Strauss, supra
note 30, at 219-36; Article, Environmental Regulation of Hardrock Mining on Public Lands:
Bringing the 1872 Law Up to Date, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 145, 163 (1980).
M See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
M36 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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not more so, dispersion of mining regulation detracts from the co-
herence of the nation's mining laws13 and makes it difficult for
companies operating in several states to engage in long-term plan-
ning or to affect the policies of the agencies regulating mining.138
Further, because abuse of the mining laws affects land-use policy
generally,139 dispersion of mining regulation prevents the nation
from having a uniform national land-use policy.
In 1872, when the extent of federal and state governments in
the West was minimal, it was reasonable to rely on miners for local
administration of the General Mining Law. It was also reasonable
for state governments later to supplant mining districts. 140 Today,
decisions concerning mineral development, conservation, and rec-
reation affect not only miners, but millions of citizens throughout
the country.14 1 It is only fair that the representatives of all the peo-
ple, not just miners or even mining states, allocate the uses to
which publicly owned lands will be put.142
B. Exploration Permits as a Replacement for Pedis Possessio
Congress should enact a system of exploratory mining permits
to replace pedis possessio and state laws governing the exploration
period.' 43 The permits should grant miners complete prediscovery
protection for a limited time period on a limited amount of land.'4
"' State laws on this subject vary widely and many are obsolete or archaic in light of
modern technology. The discovery [validation] work required by state law often serves
no useful purpose and frequently conflicts with sound land use practices and causes
needless harm to the environment .... [We believe that the development of mineral
resources is so important the Federal statutes should fully prescribe uniform methods
by which rights in these resources may be acquired.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 130. The American Mining Congress
has recommended replacing the varying state requirements with uniform federal location
requirements. American Mining Congress, supra note 64, at 2.
'3' See generally Petition, supra note 11, at 9-10 ("lack of uniform policies and direc-
tion has created domestic shortages of minerals"); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GAO REP.
No. B-125067, U.S. MINING AND MINERAL PROCESSING INDUSTRY: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS
AND IMPLICATIONS 5-9 (1979) (stressing need for better coordination of the nation's mineral
policies); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GAO REP. No. B-118678, LEARNING TO LOOK AHEAD:
THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL MINERALS POLICY AND PLANNING PRocEss 7-8 (1979) (same).
M' See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
"4 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 33-65.
"' Id. at 6 ("[Tlhe ultimate responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide for
the common defense and promote the general welfare and, in so doing, it should make use of
every tool at its command, including its control of the public land.").
"' See, e.g., id. at 126-28; Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 22-33.
144 This type of permit would also prevent the government from disposing of the land
while the permit is in effect.
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Such a permit system would eliminate pedis possessio rights and
the doctrine's requirements of actual occupancy, work toward min-
eral discovery, and physical exclusion of rivals.145
Elimination of the pedis possessio duty to exclude would save
miners the time and money they must spend under current law to
keep competing prospectors from their claims.146 The proposed
system of mining permits would also alleviate the risk of lost in-
vestments due to displacement by the federal government. 147
These reductions in the costs and risks of exploration should en-
courage capital investment in mineral development.
Exploration permits limited to specified acreage and time peri-
ods will give miners the flexibility they need to explore claims in
groups without having to risk losing claims due to lack of occu-
pancy or exploration. The time and acreage limits, if properly cali-
brated, should also prevent large-scale land speculation and the
withdrawal of land from productive use.148 Accordingly, the acre-
age limit should be high enough to allow economic development
but low enough to prevent hoarding.1 49 Similarly, the time allowed
should be sufficient to complete exploration or secure evidence of
valuable deposits, but not so long as to encourage speculation.150
Disagreement among various interest groups has stalled con-
gressional action on mining law reform. 5 The mining industry,
jealous of its unrestricted access to large portions of public
lands,1 52 resists the imposition of royalty charges or administrative
regulations.18 3 Environmentalists tend to favor a leasing system for
14 See sources cited supra note 143.
Cf. supra text following note 109.
147 Cf. supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 105; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
149 See Ladendorff, supra note 10, at 29 (recommending that permits be issued for a
minimum of 640 acres and a maximum of 3200 acres per miner per state).
150 A one-year claim with a yearly option to renew upon showing of diligent work to-
ward discovery might be appropriate. This is the time period adopted by Utah for prospect-
ing permits on state-owned land. UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-1-13 (1981).
15, Bills proposing permit systems have been introduced in Congress but have not been
passed. See, e.g., H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 1st Sass., 117 CONG. REC. 9828 (1971); H.R. 7354,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 4097 (1969). The major points of controversy are dis-
cussed in STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SocmIrY, supra note 110, at 45-50; Hagenstein,
supra note 134, at 48.4-85, 489-91.
151 Miners characterize this privilege of free access to public lands as an historic right.
See Forman, Dwyer & Cox, Basic Mining Law Provides Maximum Benefit for the General
Public, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327, 327-28 (1970).
153 They claim royalties would bankrupt small prospecting firms. See STANFORD ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW SocmTy, supra note 110, at 30-31, 38-39, and sources cited therein. This
criticism is disingenuous because the expansion of pedis possessio protection to large blocks
of claims, which industry representatives support, would hurt small firms, too; only large
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federal lands with extensive supervision by federal authorities.154
Regardless of the resolution of these controversies, however, the
enactment of an exclusive permit system would improve current
law. It will provide coherent national regulation, protect miners'
investments in exploration work, and encourage mineral develop-
ment while also avoiding the displacement of legitimate uses of
federal lands.
CONCLUSION
The common law doctrine of pedis possessio was developed to
protect the rights of miners prospecting on federal lands prior to
the discovery of valuable minerals. Pedis possessio traditionally
has protected miners from forcible, fraudulent, and surreptitious
entries on each claim they actually occupy and work. In the past
decade, some courts have approved the expansion of pedis posses-
sio protection to neighboring unworked claims. Concerned with ge-
ologic and economic constraints on modern mining, those courts
relaxed the traditional occupancy and work requirements, hoping
to encourage mineral development.
This comment has found that judicial expansion of pedis pos-
sessio will not significantly increase mineral development because
it will not give miners sufficient prediscovery protection and be-
cause it will encourage land speculation. Moreover, judicial expan-
sion of the doctrine is inappropriate because it would allow un-
checked mining industry domination of public lands.
Although regulation of the prediscovery period traditionally
has been a local function, political developments, changes in the
mining industry, and the need for national coordination of mineral
and public land-use policy make it appropriate for the federal gov-
ernment to act. Congressional legislation creating exclusive mining
exploration permits, limited in time and land area, is the best
means of giving miners additional protection without creating
problems of speculation or illegitimate monopolization of public
lands.
James M. Finberg
firms could afford the costs imposed by the pedis possessio duty to exclude rivals from the
large tracts.
154 Id. at 32-50. The environmentalists favor royalty payments and competitive bidding
for leases. They claim that bidding will result in more efficient resource allocation, id. at 33-
34, and that the current absence of royalties amounts to an inefficient subsidy to miners, id.
at 19-23. See generally Udall, The Mining Law of 1872 Must be Scrapped, 8 NAT'L WILD-
LIFE 9-11 (1970) (written by former Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall).
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